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Abstract
The paper analyzes some generic features of industrial dynamics whereby innovative
change is carried, stochastically, by new entrants. Relying on the formal representation
suggested in Winter et al. (1997), it studies both the asymptotic properties of such pro-
cesses and their finite time dynamics to account for a few empirical stylized facts, including
persistent entry and exit, skewed size distributions and turbulence in market shares.
Key words: evolution, competition, learning, stochastic entry, entrepreneurial start-
ups, expanding set of technological opportunities, industrial dynamics.
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Modeling Industrial Dynamics with Innovative
Entrants
S.G. Winter (winter@upenn.edu)
Y.M. Kaniovski (kaniov@iiasa.ac.at)
G. Dosi (dosi@iiasa.ac.at)
1 Introduction
In this work we explore the dynamic features of industries characterized by the persistent
arrival of innovative entrants. The models which follow build upon and modify the baseline
model presented in Winter et al.(1997). In an extreme synthesis, in the latter we develop a
framework of analysis of the competitive dynamics of industries composed of heterogeneous
firms and continuing stochastic entry. There, we show that despite the simplicity of the
assumptions, the model is able to account for a rather rich set of empirical ‘stylized facts’,
such as: (i) continuing turbulence in market shares; (ii) persistent inflows and outflows of
firms; (iii) ‘life cycle’ phenomena – including, in particular, nearer the birth of an industry,
relatively sudden ‘shakeouts’, yielding distinctly different industrial structure thereafter;
and (iv) skewed size distributions of firms1.
The ‘heroic’ simplicity of Winter et al. (1997) goes as far as assuming that the set
of technological options among which entrants draw – as a formal metaphor of their
diverse capabilities – is given from the start and is invariant throughout the unfolding
evolution of the industry. While this assumption is certainly in tune with the spirit of most
evolutionary game-theoretical set-ups, it is also at odds with an overwhelming empirical
evidence highlighting the role of innovators as carriers of technological and organizational
discoveries. Typically, these discoveries happen to be tapped at some point in the history
of an industry on the grounds of the available knowledge base at that time, but would not
have been possible earlier on, given the knowledge base at that earlier time.
More formally, this implies that what is commonly called the ‘production possibility
1This evidence is discussed at much greater length in the special issues of Industrial and Corporate
Change, 5, 1997 and of The International Journal of Industrial Organization, 4, 1995. See also Baldwin
(1995); Caroll and Hannan (1995); Davis et al. (1996); Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988); Dosi et al.
(1995); Geroski (1995); Hannan and Freeman (1989).
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set’ endogenously shifts, due to the cumulative (but stochastic) effects of expaloration by
potential innovators2.
The model which follows studies the properties of industrial dynamics which correspond
to that archetype of industrial evolution which some authors call Schumpeter Mark I
regime (cf. Malerba and Orsenigo (1995) and Dosi et al. (1995). In short, while of course
both incumbents and new entrants empirically attempt to explore – to varying degrees
– yet unexploited opportunities of innovation, here we focus upon the properties of that
extreme archetype whereby only entrants have a positive probability of advancing the
current state of technological knowledge. (Hence the name of such a ‘regime’, in analogy
with the emphasis of Schumpeter (1934) upon novel entrepreneurial efforts as drivers of
change.)
Compared with the cited ‘baseline model’ discussed in Winter et al. (1997), in the
following we shall try to disentangle those properties which appear to be generic features
of a wide class of processes of industrial dynamics simply resting upon persistently het-
erogeneous agents and market selection and, conversely, those properties which depend
upon more specific forms of innovative learning, such as the Schumpeter Mark I regime
considered here3. As we shall show below, some of the emerging ‘stylized facts’ of the
modeled dynamics appear to robustly hold in both set-ups, with or without innovative
entry. Other features, including some path-dependence properties, interestingly, appear
only when ‘open-ended’ dynamics on technological opportunities is accounted for, as we
do in this work.
Section 2 sets out the basic structure of the model, in a first specification with inno-
vative learning by entrants directed at increasing capital productivity, and, conversely, in
section 3, we study the properties of a symmetrical assumption of (stochastically) increas-
ing labour efficiencies.
2 The basic framework of the model: a first setting with
increasing capital efficiencies
Let us assume an industry evolving in discrete time t = 0, 1, . . .. At t = 0 there are no
firms ready to produce, but k firms arrive to the industry, ready to start manufacturing
2For more detailed empirical corroborations of these points, cf., among others, Dosi (1988) and Freeman
and Soete (1997).
3See Winter et al. (1997) also for some comparative assessment of somewhat germane models of
industrial dynamics based on much more stringent assumptions of individual forward-looking rationality
and collective equilibrium, such as Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995).
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at t = 1. At time t ≥ 1 the industry consists of nt firms which are involved in production
and a number of new firms that enter at t and will participate in manufacturing from t+1
onward. Uniformly for the whole industry we have:
v - price per unit of physical capital, v > 0,
d - depreciation rate of the capital stock, 0 < d ≤ 1.
In the first version of the model which follows the output is produced by capital alone.
The competitiveness of any firm represented in the industry is ultimately determined by
its capital per unit of output. Let us designate the latter by ai for the i-th firm. As
time goes on, the “best” capital/output ratio (in real terms) attainable in the industry
decreases.
Let us further assume the following endogenous stochastic mechanism of learning by
entrants. Take a nonnegative random variable ξ with a finite variance Dξ. Set ζ for a
random variable distributed over [a, b], 0 < a < b < ∞. For each time instant t ≥ 0
we allow for the industry to have k ≥ 1 new firms4 whose levels of capital per unit of
output are randomly determined as exp{−At}ζ
i, tk + 1 ≤ i ≤ (t + 1)k. Here At+1 =
At + ξ
t+1, t ≥ 0, A0 = ξ
0. Also, ξt, t ≥ 0, and ζi, i ≥ 1, are mutually independent
collections of realizations of ξ and ζ. Thus, all capital ratios feasible for newcomers at time
t belong to [exp{−At}a, exp{−At}b]. Their distribution within this interval is governed
by a realization of exp{−At}ζ. Consequently, At characterizes in a probabilistic way the
highest productivity of capital attainable to newcomers in the industry at time t. Note
that by construction in this competitive environment only newcomers learn to improve the
productivity of capital.
The productive capacity of the i-th firm is Qit = Ki(t)/ai, where Ki(t) stands for the
capital of the i-th firm at time t. The total productive capacity of the industry involved
in manufacturing at time t is
Qt =
nt∑
i=1
Qit.
We assume a decreasing continuous demand function p = H(q), mapping [0,∞) in [0, H(0)]
such that H(0) <∞ and H(q)→ 0 as q →∞, where as usual, p stands for the price and
q for demanded quantities. (Thus, the price at time t equals H(Qt).) The gross profit per
unit of output at t is also H(Qt) since, without loss of generality we may also assume zero
variable costs. The gross investment per unit of output at t is a share of the gross profit,
4Unlike the ‘baseline model’in Winter et al. (1997), we assume here for simplicity a fixed number of
entrants. However, the qualitative properties of the models which follow would not change were we to
allow for stochastic entry. Moreover, they would hold also if the probability of entry were made dependent
upon current profitabilities of incumbents (cf. variants, p.9 of Winter et al. (1997)).
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i.e. λH(Qt), where the constant λ captures the share of the gross profit which does not
leak out as the interest payments and shareholders’ dividends, and can be considered to
be a measure for the propensity to invest. The total gross investment per unit of capital
for the i-th firm at time t reads λH(Qt)/vai.
For each capital ratio generated at t we shall allow a single entrant. Entrants’ initial
capitals are independent realizations θi, i ≥ 1, of a random variable θ distributed over
[c, h], 0 < c < h < ∞. (It is assumed that the realizations of ξ, ζ and θ are mutually
independent random variables.)
To complete the description of the competitive environment we need some death mech-
anism. A firm is dead at time t and does not participate in the production process from
t+ 1 onward if its capital at t is less than ǫc, ǫ ∈ (0, 1]5.
We assume that all random elements are given on a probability space {Ω,F , P}.
In order to study the long run behavior of this industry, let us give a formal description
of its evolution.
2.1 A dynamical setting of the model
Let firm i be manufacturing during time t. Our investment rule implies that at the end
of this production period its capital is
Qitai
[
1− d+
λ
vai
H(Qt)
]
.
If this value does not drop below the death threshold ǫc, the firm continues to manufacture
during time instant t+ 1. Otherwise it dies. To capture these possibilities, we introduce
χQit[1−d+
λ
vai
H(Qt)]≥ǫc/ai
the indicator function of the event that the firm continues to man-
ufacture. As usual, for a relation A we set that
χA =
{
1, if A is true,
0, otherwise.
Now the evolution of the i-th firm (in terms of productive capacity) reads
Qit+1 = Q
i
t
[
1− d+
λ
vai
H(Qt)
]
χQit[1−d+
λ
vai
H(Qt)]≥ǫc/ai
. (2.1)
These equations are not handy for analysis. Mortality implies that nt, the number of
firms in business, changes over time. Thus, we have a system with a variable dimension.
Moreover, these equations do not incorporate the entry process: hence (2.1) only captures
a part of the evolution of the industry. In order to handle entry and variable numbers
of incumbents one needs a dynamic representation of the model that leaves room for all
feasible development paths. It is nested in an infinite dimensional space.
5The situation without mortality can be thought of as a limit case when ǫ = 0.
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Introduce a space R∞ of vectors with denumerably many coordinates. Set
R∞ = R
⊗[ ∞⊗
i=1
Ri
]
,
where
⊗
stands for the direct sum of a real line R and 2k-dimensional real vector spaces
Ri, i ≥ 1. Thus, for every q ∈ R∞
q = q
⊗[ ∞⊗
i=1
qi
]
(2.2)
with q ∈ R and qi ∈ Ri, i ≥ 1. Define an automorphism D(·) on R∞ such that
D(q) = D1(q)
⊗[ ∞⊗
i=2
Di(q)
]
,
where D1(·) : R∞ 7→ R
⊗
R1
⊗
R2 and D
i(·) : R∞ 7→ Ri, i ≥ 3. Let
D11(q) = q, D
1
s(q) = 0, 2 ≤ s ≤ 2k + 1, D
1
2k+j+1(q) = q
1
j exp{−q}χA1j (q)
,
D13k+j+1(q) = q
1
k+j
[
1− d+
λ
v
H(
k∑
s=1
[q1k+s exp{q}/q
1
s +
∞∑
i=2
qik+s/q
i
s]) exp{q}/q
1
j
]
χA1
j
(q),
Dij(q) = q
i
jχAij (q)
, Dik+j(q) = q
i
k+j
[
1− d+
λ
v
H(
k∑
s=1
[q1k+s exp{q}/q
1
s+
∞∑
p=2
qpk+s/q
p
s ])/q
i
j)
]
χAi
j
(q),
where 1 ≤ j ≤ k, i ≥ 2, A1j (q) designates the relation
q1k+j
[
1− d+
λ
v
H(
k∑
s=1
[q1k+s exp{q}/q
1
s +
∞∑
i=2
qik+s/q
i
s]) exp{q}/q
1
j
]
≥ ǫc
and Aij(q) stands for the relation
qik+j
[
1− d+
λ
v
H(
k∑
s=1
[q1k+s exp{q}/q
1
s +
∞∑
p=2
qpk+s/q
i
s])/q
i
j
]
≥ ǫc.
We restrict ourselves to vectors q defined by (2.2) belonging to
R+∞ = [0,∞)
⊗[ ∞⊗
i=1
R+i
]
and set H(∞) = 0 for the case when the iterated sum involved in the above expressions
is infinite. Here
R+i = {q
i ∈ Ri : q
i
j > 0, q
i
k+j ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , k, }, i ≥ 1.
Also, Dis(·) and q
i
s stand for the s-th coordinates of D
i(·) and qi.
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Define infinite dimensional random vectors Yt, t ≥ 0, setting
Y t1 = ξ
t, Y ti+1 = ζ
tk+i, Y tk+i+1 = θ
tk+i, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Y tj = 0 j ≥ 2k + 2.
(Note that here we number coordinates linearly rather than in terms of cohorts as above.)
The evolution of the industry is as follows
q(t+ 1) = D(q(t)) +Yt+1, t ≥ 0, q(0) = Y0, (2.3)
Since Yt are independent in t, this expression defines a Markov process on R+∞. Moreover,
since the deterministic operator D(·) as well as the distribution of Yt do not depend on
time, the process is homogeneous in time.
Conceptually, this phase space is formed by the value characterizing the highest pro-
ductivity which is potentially attainable at any time in the industry (the first coordinate),
capitals per unit of output (the first k coordinates in each cohort, that is, a 2k×2k box in
the above structure) and individual capital stocks (the last k coordinates in each cohort:
that is, to a capital ratio placed at the j-th position corresponds the capital placed at
the (k + j)-th position) of all firms that stay alive. Therefore, if qnk+i(t) > 0 for some
i = 1, 2, . . . , k and n ≤ t, then it means that a firm with qni (t) as capital per unit of output
came to the industry at t−n has been alive until t, that is, has manufactured n−1 times,
and continues to produce during the t-th time period. The representation via a direct sum
seems to be a handy way of explicitly capturing the dynamic of cohorts.
The formulas forDi(·), i ≥ 2, reflect our investment rule together with the assumption
that the capital ratio remains constant through the lifetime of a firm. In analogy with (2.1),
they are capturing the dynamic of capital stocks (more precisely (2.1) refers to productive
capacities). The indicators are needed because of the death rule6. The relation Aij(q)
gives the criterion that a firm from the i-th box placed at the j-th position continues to
manufacture given the state of the industry q. As from above, the first coordinate carries
the value determining the highest productivity attainable in the industry. The further
2k×2k block is zero to host newcoming firms. The next k ones reflect the learning rule on
improvement of productivity adopted by newcoming firms. Finally, the last k coordinates
of D1(·) are defined according to our investment rule.
Given this formal description of this process of industry evolution, let us proceed to
the analysis of its long run behavior.
6In particular, applied to the first k coordinates in a cohort, they prevent from carring over the capital
ratios of firms that have died. However, the use of the death indicators to the first k coordinates is basically
a matter of taste: without relevance for the conclusions, dropping them implies that the capital ratios of
dead firms are in the structure of the model forever.
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2.2 Asymptotic properties of the industry
Define B∞ the minimal σ-field in R∞ generated by sets of the following form
A = A
⊗[ ∞⊗
j=1
Aj
]
, (2.4)
where A designates a set from the σ-field of Borel sets B on the real line, and Aj being
a set from the σ-field of Borel sets Bj in Rj. For every such set A one step transition
probability of process (2.3) reads
p1(q,A) = P{D(q) +Y ∈ A} = P{Y∗ ∈ A
⊗
A1}χD(q)∈
⊗
∞
i=2
Ai . (2.5)
Here Y∗ stands for the (2k+ 1)-dimensional vector whose coordinates coincide with first
2k + 1 coordinates of a generic vector Y having the same distribution as Yt, t ≥ 0.
To study the ergodic properties of process (2.3), we need the following condition which
is due to Doeblin (see Doob (1953), p. 192).
There is a finite positive measure φ(·) with φ(R+∞) > 0 and a positive number δ such
that for all q ∈ R+∞p
1(q,A) ≤ 1− δ if φ(A) ≤ δ.
For a set A as in (2.4) let φ(A) = P{Y∗ ∈ A
⊗
A1}. From (2.4) it follows that
p1(q,A) ≤ φ(A). Since φ(R+∞) = P{Y
∗ ∈ [0,∞)
⊗
R+1 } = 1, restricting ourselves to
δ ≤ 1/2, we get that, if φ(A) ≤ δ, then p1(q,A) ≤ δ ≤ 1 − δ. Thus, Doeblin’s condition
holds for this choice of φ(·) and all δ ∈ (0, 1/2].
Now, by Theorem 5.7 from Doob (1953) (p. 214), we see that
π(q,A) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
pt(q,A)
defines for each q ∈ R+∞ a stationary absolute distribution. Here p
t(x, ·) stands for the
transition probability in t steps, that is,
pt(q,A) =
∫
R+∞
pt−1(y,A)dp1(q, y), t ≥ 2.
The stationary distribution π(q, ·) turns out to be the same, that is π$(·), for all q be-
longing to the same ergodic set $ (see Doob (1953), p. 210). It has the following generic
property∫
$
p1(x,A)dπ$(x) = π$(A).
In general, it is not possible to find an explicit expression for π$(·) from this relation.
Thus, we may only obtain the following result concerning ergodicity of process (2.3).
Theorem 2.1. For every set A given by (2.4) with probability one
1
n
n∑
t=1
pt(Y0,A)→ π(Y0,A) (2.6)
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as n → ∞. Here π(Y0, ·) is a stochastic probability measure (since it depends on Y0),
with π$(·) for any elementary outcome ω ∈ Ω, whereby Y
0 belongs for this elementary
outcome to an ergodic set $.
Consider the implications of this result in terms of path dependency. On the one hand,
Doeblin’s condition implies that events occuring at t and t+n are getting more and more
statistically independent as n increases. Thus, the impact of the initial state vanishes as
time goes on. Should one be able to prove that there is a single ergodic set, then the
limit of time averages in (2.6) would not depend on the initial state: hence the lack of
path-dependency. On the other hand, the limit in (2.6), in general, does depend on the
initial state. But the dependency acts in a way that such limit turns out to be the same for
all initial states belonging to the same ergodic set. Therefore, there might indeed be some
path-dependency which is governed by a partition of Ω. Note also that this partition, in
general, turns out to be less fine than the one given by Y0.
Theorem 2.1 implies that, for every uniformly bounded characteristic of the industry,
its time averages converge with probability one to a limit which is a deterministic func-
tion of the initial state in the sense given above. Unfortunately, – unlike for the model
considered by Winter et al. (1997) –, some of the most important dynamic characteris-
tics such as, for example, the total productive capacity, here are not uniformly bounded.
Hence, Theorem 2.1 does not allow for immediate conceptual conclusions analogous to the
ergodicity result presented in the foregoing work. On the other hand, one is still able to
establish convergence of time averages of other aggregate variables such as the gross profit
rate. Set
rt =
QtH(Qt)∑∞
i=1
∑k
j=1 q
i
k+j(t)
for the gross profit rate at t ≥ 1. Since there is no production at t = 0, r0 = 0. As a
consequence of Theorem 2.1 we have the following statement.
Corollary 2.1. If xH(x) ≤ const for x→∞, then with probability one
1
n
n∑
i=1
ri →
∫
R+∞
Q(y)H(Q(y))∑∞
i=1
∑k
j=1 y
i
k+j
dπ(Y0, dy) (2.7)
as n→∞. Here for a vector y of the form (2.2)
Q(y) =
k∑
s=1
[
y1k+s exp{y}/y
1
s +
∞∑
i=2
yik+s/y
i
s
]
.
Indeed, QtH(Qt) ≤ const by hypothesis. Also
∞∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
qik+j (t) ≥
k∑
i=1
θ(t−1)k+i ≥ kc, t ≥ 1.
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Hence rt ≤ const/kc <∞. Which implies that (2.7) follows from (1.6).
Note that if limx→∞ xH(x) = H , then
1
n
n∑
i=1
ri → H
∫
R+∞
dπ(Y0, y)∑∞
i=1
∑k
j=1 y
i
k+j
.
As mentioned, the total productive capacity of this industry unboundedly increases as
time goes on. More precisely, we have the following statement.
Lemma 2.1. The total productive capacity Qt of the industry goes to infinity with
probability one as t→∞.
The lemma is proved in the Appendix.
Now let us study the mortality of firms in this competitive environment.
Theorem 2.2. If ǫ > 0, then every firm dies in a finite random time with probability
one.
The proof is given in the Appendix. The argument exploits the fact that the total
productive capacity of the industry grows without bound, which implies that every firm
with a fixed capital per unit of output starts shrinking from a finite random time with
probability one.
Having shown the unbounded increase of productive capacity as time goes on, let us
now characterize its rate of growth.
Theorem 2.3. With probability one exp{−αt}Qt →∞ as t→ ∞ for every α < Eξ.
Moreover, if
lim
x→∞
H(x)x = 0, (2.8)
then with probability one exp{−αt}Qt → 0 as t→∞ for every α > Eξ.
The theorem is proved in the Appendix.
Remark 2.1. The same result obtains if, instead of (2.8), we require that
lim sup
x→∞
H(x)x < d
kvca
λb
. (2.9)
Now, if for a positive number H a demand function decreases as H/x for x → ∞, then,
keeping all other parameters of the model involved in the right hand side of (2.9) fixed, one
can ensure (2.9) just increasing k. Thus, for such demand functions the second statement
of Theorem 2.3 always holds true if the number of newcoming firms is large enough.
Thus, we have showed that the productive capacity of the industry always grows faster
than exp{tα} for every α < Eξ. If, additionally, the demand function declines fast enough
(see (2.8) or (2.9)), then the productive capacity always grows slower than exp{tα} for ev-
ery α > Eξ. Consequently, the threshold value Eξ is the only candidate for the growth rate
in the class of exponential functions of time. This growth is entirely due to the increasing
–10 –
efficiency of newcoming firms, and is not dependent upon the investment mechanism em-
ployed in the model. Interestingly, one is not able to prove that exp{−tEξ}Qt converges
to a limit as t increases. Indeed, here we are facing with a variety of growth regimes. Each
of them is determined probabilistically by the development path (i.e. also a particular
“technological trajectory”) and is deviating from the main trend, exp{tEξ}, by a value
vanishing as t → ∞ faster than exp{−tβ} for every β > 0. Hence, these deviations are
not detectable if we restrict ourselves to the class of exponential functions of time. To un-
derstand why this happens, let us consider the asymptotic behavior of the value Vt giving
the lower bound for the total productive capacity since Qt+1 ≥ Vt.
The random variable Vt is a product of the two other ones: exp{At} and Θ
t. The
latter, Θt, does not contribute to the growth rate since its distribution does not depend
on t, being a convolution of k copies of θ/ζ. Hence, let us focus on At. We have that
At =
t∑
i=0
ξi = (t+ 1)Eξ +
t∑
i=0
ξi∗,
where ξi∗ = ξ
i − Eξi, i ≥ 0. The law of iterated logarithm (see Loe`ve (1955), p. 260)
implies that
P
{
lim sup
t→∞
|
∑t
i=0 ξ
i
∗|√
2Dξ(t+ 1) ln lnDξ(t+ 1)
= 1
}
= 1,
taking into account that the random variables ξ and ξ − Eξ have the same variance.
Consequently, there are subsequencies t+n , n ≥ 1, and t
−
n , n ≥ 1, such that with
probability one
lim
n→∞
∑t+n
i=0 ξ
i
∗√
2Dξ(t+n + 1) ln lnDξ(t
+
n + 1)
= 1
and
lim
n→∞
∑t−n
i=0 ξ
i
∗√
2Dξ(t−n + 1) ln lnDξ(t
−
n + 1)
= −1.
Consequently, as n→∞
exp{At+n − (t
+
n + 1)Eξ} ∼ exp
{√
2Dξ(t+n + 1) ln lnDξ(t
+
n + 1)
}
(2.10)
and
exp{At−n − (t
−
n + 1)Eξ} ∼ exp
{
−
√
2Dξ(t−n + 1) ln lnDξ(t
−
n + 1)
}
with probability one. Thus, what remains in exp{At} if we remove its main part, exp{(t+
1)Eξ}, can be converging (along certain sequencies) with probability one to both infinity
and zero. Hence, the remaining value does not have any definite rate of growth as time
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goes on. Also, (2.10) shows that there is no hope to find a finite limit for exp{−tEξ}Qt
as t→∞. Indeed, since Qt+1 ≥ Vt, by (2.10) we get that with probability one
exp{−t+nEξ}Qt+n ≥ exp{−t
+
nEξ}Vt+n−1 →∞ as n→∞.
Hence, we find here a path-dependency property of the model. While we have proved
that the threshold value of the rate of growth is exponential, it is history which selects the
exact value of such rate.
2.3 Different time-scales of technological learning
So far one has assumed that production, entry and learning (by entrants) all take place
on the same time-scale (i.e. at each “period”). However, the model can be extended to
account also for a timing of innovative “events” asynchronous vis-a`-vis production and
entry. Suppose, for example, that the enlargement of innovative opportunities occurs at a
slower pace.
This phenomenon may be formalized in the following way.
Let Tn, n ≥ 0, be an increasing sequence of positive integers such that T0 = 0 and
Tn+1 − Tn ≥ 1. Also, let
An+1 = An + ξ
n+1, n ≥ 0,
and levels of capital per unit of output of all firms coming during the time interval
(Tn, Tn+1) from the distribution concentrated on [exp{−An}a, exp{−An}b]. So, capital
ratios of the k-firms coming at time t are determined as exp{−An}ζ
i, tk+1 ≤ i ≤ (t+1)k
provided that Tn ≤ t < Tn+1. Here ξ
n, n ≥ 0, and ζi, i ≥ 1, are mutually independent
collections of realizations of ξ and ζ.
The sequence Tn, n ≥ 0, characterizes the slower pace of generation of potential innova-
tions as compared to the timing of manufacturing “periods”. Hence the main component
of the rate of growth of capital productivity for individual entrants and for the whole in-
dustry (under some additional assumptions cf. Theorem 2.3 and Remark 2.1) as t→∞ is
determined by the function exp{T−1(t) · Eξ}. Here T−1(·) designates an inverse function
to T (·) : n→ Tn. For example, if Tn = s · n for an integer s > 1, then
lim
t→∞
exp{T−1(t) · Eξ}
exp{Eξs t}
= 1.
Similarly, if Tn equals to the integer part of exp{α ·n} for a real α > 0 (and for sufficiently
large n), then
lim
t→∞
t−
Eξ
α exp{T−1(t) · Eξ} = 1.
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Clearly, asynchronous (and slower) paces of expansion of innovative opportunities will
imply also slower rates of growth of output of the industry under consideration.
2.4 A computer simulation
To illustrate some quantitative properties of the model, let us consider a computer simu-
lation7.
The run presented here has the following parametrization: k = 12, v = 1, d = 0.3,
λ = 0.6, a = 2, b = 6, c = 0.02, h = 0.04, ǫ = 0.5. The demand function is
H(x) = 4.1667 exp(−0.1x). The random variable ζ is uniformly distributed over [a, b],
ξ was uniformly distributed over [0, 0.01], and the capitals of newcoming firms are uni-
formly distributed over [c, h].
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present the dynamic of prices. While prices decline to 0 with
persistent fluctuations, the total productive capacity grows over time with qualitatively
similar fluctuating patterns, whereby the amplitude of fluctuations themselves does not
dampen out over time (in fact, in absolute terms, they increase): see Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the dynamic of the number of firms in the industry. After an
initial period of growth it declines, and then fluctuates around a fixed level. As already
noted in Winter et al. (1997), phenomena looking like ‘shakeouts’ at some point in the
early history of an industry appear to be a rather generic property plausibly associated
with a changing selection regime. At the start, the ‘carrying capacity’ of the market
exceeds the effective supply. So, in a sense, there is ‘room for everyone’. At some point, as
total supply increases, competitive conditions become more stringent and market selection
rather quickly starts affecting growth and survival of lower-efficiency firms8. Figures 2.6
and 2.7 provide two snapshots, measured in terms of productive capacity for t = 50
and t = 500, where firms are ranked according to their size. What is observed here
is something rather close to the Pareto law (see, for example, Ijiri and Simon (1974))9.
7A lot of simulation of this kind has been undertaken based on a program from the Laboratory for
Simulation Development (LSD), a package providing an environment for implementation of simulation
models developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). It is publicly avail-
able via Internet (see also Valente (1997)). We have tried several runs with the same parametrization
(since each ‘history’ is a particular sample path of the stochastic process defined by the above model)
and we also experimented with different parametrizations. Even if we did not perform any more rigorous
sensitivity analysis, the qualitative feature of the example which follows hold throughout all the performed
experiments.
8In many respects, the phenomenon recalls the “density dependent selection” emphasized in “organi-
zational ecology” models (cf. among others Hannan and Freeman (1989) and Carroll (1997)).
9Namely, in one of its versions, for a sample of firms ranked according to their size, the size s and the
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Figure 2.1: The price H(Qt) for 1 ≤ t ≤ 50.
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Figure 2.2: The price H(Qt) for 1 ≤ t ≤ 500.
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Figure 2.3: Productive capacity for 1 ≤ t ≤ 50.
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Figure 2.4: Productive capacity for 1 ≤ t ≤ 500.
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Figure 2.5: Total number of firms 0 ≤ t ≤ 500.
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Figure 2.6: Size distribution for t = 50.
Figures 2.8 provides with the life time distribution of firms for 1 ≤ t ≤ 500 which died
before t = 500. Life time here means the number of production cycles the firm performs
before it dies. (So for example, in Figure 2.8, around 18% of all firms which where born
and died before t = 500, did die when they where 6-periods old, etc.) Again, the mortality
patterns appear to be quite in tune with the evidence, with high mortality rates shortly
rank r of a firm are related in the following manner srβ = A, where β and A are positive constants.
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Figure 2.7: Size distribution for t = 500.
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Figure 2.8: Life time distribution of firms for 1 ≤ t ≤ 500.
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after birth and a (relative thin) tail of firms with much higher longevity (more on this
type of evidence in Geroski (1995), Baldwin (1995), Hannan and Freeman (1989), and
Carroll (1997)). As known, this survival patterns are sometimes interpreted – especially
in the “organizational ecology” perspective – as the outcome of the differential adaptation
of subsets of firms in the population. Notwithstanding the likely importance of the latter
phenomena, our results here seem to suggest that a distribution of mortality rates which
peaks in the early infancy, with a long but thin tale of old survivers might be a rather
generic property of a large class of evolutionary processes characterized by heterogenous
entry and market selection (cf. also the simulation results in Winter et al. (1997))10.
3 An alternative dynamic setting: increasing productivity
of labor
3.1 Main assumptions
Now we turn to symmetric opposite assumptions compared to the model above and assume
that learning concerns only labor productivity11. As above, we have an industry evolving
in discrete time t = 0, 1, . . .. At t = 0 there are no firms ready to manufacture, but k firms
come to the industry. They will start producing at t = 1. At time t ≥ 1 the industry
consists of nt firms which are involved in manufacturing and new firms that enter at t and
will participate in the production process from t + 1 on. As in the earlier version of the
model we have uniformly for the whole industry:
v - price per unit of physical capital, v > 0,
d - depreciation rate, 0 < d ≤ 1,
C - capital per unit of output, C > 0.
Here, however, the competitiveness of any firm in the industry is determined by its
variable costs per unit of output. Let us designate it by mi for the i-th firm. In this com-
petitive environment only newcomers learn how to improve (in probability) the productivity
of labor. As time goes on the lowest variable costs present in the industry decreases. In
particular, we have the following stochastic mechanism defined endogenously.
Consider a nonnegative random variable ξ with a finite varianceDξ. Set ζ for a random
variable distributed over [a, b], 0 < a < b < ∞. For each time instant t ≥ 0 we allow for
the industry to have k ≥ 1 new firms whose variable costs are randomly determined as
10A fortiori, one should expect this property to apply also to those circumstances wherein also incumbents
are allowed to learn, as in a forthcoming model by the authors, currently in progress.
11An assumption, which together with the constancy of capital/output ratios, seems nearer the empirical
evidence.
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exp{−At}ζ
i, tk+1 ≤ i ≤ (t+1)k. Here At+1 = At+ξ
t+1, t ≥ 0, A0 = ξ
0. Also, ξt, t ≥ 0,
and ζi, i ≥ 1, are mutually independent collections of realizations of ξ and ζ. One sees
that all variable costs feasible for newcomers at time t belong to [exp{−At}a, exp{−At}b].
Their distribution over this interval is governed by a realization of exp{−At}ζ. Thus At
characterizes in a probabilistic manner the highest productivity of labor attainable by
newcomers in the industry at time t.
Alike in the model above there is a decreasing continuous demand function p = H(q),
mapping [0,∞) in [0, H(0)] such that H(0) <∞ and H(q)→ 0 as q →∞.
Set Qit for the productive capacity of the i-th firm and mi for its variable costs. Then
Qt =
nt∑
i=1
Qit, t ≥ 1, Q0 = 0,
is the total productive capacity involved in manufacturing at t. The gross profit per unit
of output at t for the i-th firm is obviously H(Qt) − mi. Its total gross investment per
unit of capital is λmax[H(Qt)−mi, 0]/vC. As above, the constant λ captures the share
of the gross profit which is re-invested.
For each value of variable costs generated at t we shall allow a single entrant. The
initial capitals of entrants are independent realizations θi, i ≥ 1, of a random variable θ
distributed over [c, h], 0 < c < h < ∞. It is assumed that the realizations of ξ, ζ and θ
are mutually independent random variables.
Again, as above, the death mechanism implies that a firm is dead at time t and does
not participate in manufacturing from t+ 1 on if its capital at t is less than ǫc, ǫ ∈ (0, 1].
The situation without mortality corresponds to the limit case when ǫ = 0.
3.2 A dynamic balance equation for industry evolution
Consider a firm i that is manufacturing at time t. Our investment rule implies that at the
end of this production period its capital reads
QitC
{
1− d+
λ
vC
max[H(Qt)−mi, 0]
}
.
If this value does not drop below the death threshold ǫc, the firm continues to manufacture
at t+ 1. Otherwise it dies.12 Hence,
Qit+1 = Q
i
t
{
1− d+
λ
vC
max[H(Qt)−mi, 0]
}
χQit{1−d+
λ
vC
max[H(Qt)−mi,0]}≥ǫc/C
, (3.1)
12In a possibly more realistic setting one could add a sort of bankruptcy rule stating that firms die, even
when their size is greater than EC, if tgheir gross profits are negative (i.e. [H(Qt) −mi] < 0). However,
this modification would not qualitatively change the results that follow: rather it would simply affect death
rates of ’uncompetitive’ firms.
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where χQit{1−d+
λ
vC
max[H(Qt)−mi,0]}≥ǫc/C
is the indicator function of the event that the firm
continues to manufacture given the above death rule and the total productive capacity of
the industry involved in manufacturing.
This equation describes the evolution of a single firm in business. In analogy with the
formalization of the foregoing section, let us proceed to a dynamic representation of the
model that reserves room for all feasible development paths of the industry.
For the space R∞ introduced in section 2, define an automorphism D(·) on R∞ such
that
D(q) = D1(q)
⊗[ ∞⊗
i=2
Di(q)
]
,
with D1(·) : R∞ 7→ R
⊗
R1
⊗
R2 and D
i(·) : R∞ 7→ Ri, i ≥ 3. Set
D11(q) = q, D
1
s(q) = 0, 2 ≤ s ≤ 2k + 1, D
1
2k+j+1(q) = q
1
j exp{−q}χA1
j
(q),
D13k+j+1(q) =
{
q1k+j
[
1− d+
λ
vC
max
[
H(
∞∑
p=1
k∑
s=1
qpk+s)− q
1
j exp{−q}, 0
]}
χA1j (q)
,
Dij(q) = q
i
jχAi
j
(q), D
i
k+j(q) = q
i
k+j
{
1− d+
λ
vC
max
[
H(
∞∑
p=1
k∑
s=1
qpk+s)− q
i
j, 0
]}
χAi
j
(q),
where 1 ≤ j ≤ k, i ≥ 2, A1j (q) designates the relation
q1k+j
{
1− d+
λ
vC
max
[
H(
∞∑
p=1
k∑
s=1
qpk+s)− q
1
j exp{−q}, 0
]}
≥ ǫc/C
and Aij(q) stands for the relation
qik+j
{
1− d+
λC
v
max
[
H(
∞∑
p=1
k∑
s=1
qpk+s)− q
i
j , 0
]}
≥ ǫc/C.
We restrict ourselves to vectors q defined by (2.2) belonging to
R+∞ = [0,∞)
⊗[ ∞⊗
i=1
R+i
]
and set H(∞) = 0 for the case when the iterated sum is infinite.
The conceptual interpretation of the automorphism is very similar to the one given
earlier on. The 2k × 2k boxes contain data concerning cohorts, that is groups of firms
which were born simultaneously. The only exception is the first box containing two cohorts
and additionally (its first coordinate) the value capturing the highest productivity of labor
attainable in the industry. In each cohort the first k coordinates are the variable costs
and the last k coordinates represent productive capacities of corresponding firms. The
adjustment rule for productive capacities is the same as in (3.1). (Again, the indicators
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prevent from carring over the data related dead firms.) The relation Aij(q) means that a
firm which is placed at the j-th position of the i-th cohort continues to manufacture given
the state of the industry q.
Define infinite dimensional random vectors Yt, t ≥ 0, setting
Y t1 = ξ
t, Y ti+1 = ζ
tk+i, Y tk+i+1 = θ
tk+i, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Y tj = 0 j ≥ 2k + 2.
The evolution of the industry is as follows
q(t+ 1) = D(q(t)) +Yt+1, t ≥ 0, q(0) = Y0, (3.2)
Since Yt are independent in t, this expression defines a Markov process on R+∞. Moreover,
it is homogeneous in time since the deterministic operator D(·) as well as the distribution
of Yt do not depend on time.
This phase space is formed by the value characterizing the highest productivity which
is potentially attainable so far in the industry, variable costs and productive capacities of
all firms that stay alive.
3.3 Long run behavior of the industry
As above, Doeblin’s condition holds here if we set φ(A) = P{Y∗ ∈ A
⊗
A1} for a set
A given by (2.4). Here Y∗ designates a (2k + 1)-dimensional vector whose coordinates
coincide with first 2k + 1 coordinates of a generic vector Y having the same distribution
as Yt, t ≥ 0. The following result establishes the ergodicity of process (3.1).
Theorem 3.1. For every set A given by (2.4) with probability one
1
n
n∑
t=1
pt(Y0,A)→ π(Y0,A) (3.3)
as n → ∞. Here π(Y0, ·) is a stochastic probability measure (since it depends on Y0),
being π$(·) for an elementary outcome ω ∈ Ω as long as Y
0 belongs for this elementary
outcome to an ergodic set $. Moreover, pt(·, ·) designates the transition probability in t
steps of process (3.2).
The implications of this theorem in terms of path-dependency (or lack of it) are iden-
tical to those discussed above with reference to Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.1 implies that for every uniformly bounded characteristic of the industry
its time averages converge with probability one to a limit which is a deterministic function
of the initial state in the sense given above.
Let us now show that the total productive capacity of the industry is uniformly
bounded. Since the minimal size of a firm is bounded by the death threshold, this implies
uniform boundedness of the total number of firms in business (if ǫ > 0). Hence, we shall
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be able to derive relations similar to those given in Winter et al. (1997) on convergence
of time averages regarding some important characteristics of the industry.
Set Q¯ = H−1(dvC/2λ) and Qˆ = max(Q¯, 2kh/Cd), where H−1(·) designates the inverse
function.
Lemma 3.1. With certainty Qt ≤ Q∗ for t ≥ 1, where Q∗ = Qˆ[1+λH(0)/vC]+kh/C.
Proof. Notice that Q1 ≤ kh/C ≤ Q∗. Equations (3.1) and the assumption concerning
the entry process imply that
Qt+1 ≤ Qt
[
1− d+
λ
vC
H(Qt)
]
+
kh
C
, t ≥ 1.
If Qt ≥ Qˆ for some t ≥ 1, we get that Qt+1 ≤ Qˆ. Otherwise, if Qt < Qˆ,
Qt+1 ≤ Qt
[
1 +
λ
vC
H(Qt)
]
+
kh
C
< Qˆ
[
1 +
λ
vC
H(0)
]
+
kh
C
.
The lemma is proved.
As a simple consequence of Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.1 we have the following result.
Corollary 3.1. With probability one
1
n
n∑
t=1
Qt →
∫
R˜∞
+
∞∑
i=1
k∑
p=1
yik+pdπ(Y
0, y)
and, if ǫ > 0,
1
n
n∑
t=1
νt →
∫
R˜∞
+
∞∑
i=1
k∑
p=1
χAip(y)dπ(Y
0, y)
as n → ∞. Here νt designates the number of firms in business at t. Also, for a vector q
given by (2.2)
R˜∞+ =
{
q ∈ R∞+ :
∞∑
i=1
k∑
p=1
qik+p ≤ Q∗
}
.
The relation Aip(y) is defined as above.
Indeed, the infinite sum involved in the first limit is bounded by Q∗ by Lemma 3.1.
The sum involved in the second limit does not exceed CQ∗/ǫc <∞ if ǫ > 0.
Let us turn to the death process.
Theorem 3.2. If ǫ > 0, then each firm dies in a finite random time with probability
one.
The proof is given in the Appendix. The intuition is the following.
For simplicity let ǫ < 1. (If ǫ = 1, we need a more complicated argument.) Each firm
comes with a capital that exceeds c. If it dies, at the moment when this happens its capital
does not exceed ǫc. Since firms with lower variable costs per unit of output have higher
investment rates, a notional firm that lives infinitely long would shrink at least ǫ times
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during the life time of a generic firm characterized by the lowest variable costs per unit of
output at some particular time (which nonetheless dies in a finite time). Consequently, to
prove that no firm can live infinitely long, it is enough to show that:
a) the capital of every alive firm is bounded from above by a constant;
b) for every level of variable costs per unit of output there is an infinite chain of firms
with lower variable costs that are coming and dying one after another.
The capital of an alive firm is bounded from above by the total capital of the industry
which, in turn, is bounded with certainty. Thus, a) holds. The capital of an alive firm
is bounded from below by the death threshold and the total capital of the industry is
bounded with certainty. Hence the total number of alive firms is bounded with certainty.
Consequently, starting from a finite random time τ every newcoming firm dies in a finite
time. According to the postulated learning rule, for every given level of variable costs per
unit of output, all newcoming firms have lower variable costs starting from a finite random
time τ ′. Thus, from max(τ, τ ′) onward we have the chain required by b).
Interestingly, in this model the total productive capacity can be indefinitely growing
if we drop the assumption that limx→∞H(x) = 0. Namely, let limx→∞H(x) = H and
λH/vC > d. Then every firm whose variable costs are less than H − vCd/λ will un-
boundedly grow. Hence, starting from a finite random time with probability one every
newcomer will never die, but rather unboundedly grow. The intuition behind this prop-
erty is the following. As H(x) approaches its asymptotic value, demand elasticities grow
and so does the “carring capacity” of the market. Correspondingly, selective presures get
weaker. Since output prices have a positive lower bound, if gross margin are high enough
(that is if variable costs are low enough) as to sustain positive net investments, then firms
which fulfill these conditions will indefinitely survive (and indeed grow), irrespectively of
the fact that an infinite number of even more efficient firms will enter thereafter. One will
still observe a dynamic on market shares (with all firms having eventually their shares
tending to zero), but given an infinitely expanding market, the number of firms will also
be allowed to infinitely grow, and mortality will cease to operate as a selection device.
Moreover, the total productive capacity of the economy will also grow in the foregoing
circumstances faster than γt as t→∞ for every 0 < γ < 1− d+ λH/vC but slower than
(1− d+ λH/vC)t. In these circumstances, (1− d+ λH/vC)t establishes the upper bound
of all feasible rates of growth, with history selecting among them. Hence, some (bounded)
path-dependency property of industrial dynamics reappears, as soon as the size of the
market is allowed to endlessly grow.
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Figure 3.1: The price H(Qt) for 1 ≤ t ≤ 500.
3.4 A numerical run of the model
Let us turn again to an illustration with a computer simulation (for details cf. footnote 6,
above).
The run presented here has the following parametrization: k = 12, v = 1, C = 2,
d = 0.3, λ = 0.6, ǫ = 0.5. The demand function is H(x) = 4.1667 exp(−0.1x). The
random variable ζ is uniformly distributed over [2, 6]; ξ is uniformly distributed over
[0, 0.01], and the capitals of newcoming firms are uniformly distributed over [0.02, 0.04].
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the price dynamics, while Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show for the
same time interval the dynamics of the total productive capacity. The evolution of the
total number of firms is shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, with Figures 3.7 and 3.8 depicting
size distributions at t = 50 and t = 500. (For prices, productive capacity and number
of firms we report also longer simulation runs, with t = 1000, for a clearer illustration of
the long term properties toward which the system tends to converge.) Finally, Figure 3.9
provides the life time distribution for firms that die before t = 500.
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Figure 3.2: The price H(Qt) for 1 ≤ t ≤ 1000.
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Figure 3.3: The total productive capacity Qt for 1 ≤ t ≤ 500.
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Figure 3.4: The total productive capacity Qt for 1 ≤ t ≤ 1000.
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Figure 3.5: The total number of firms 0 ≤ t ≤ 500.
Many qualitative properties of the dynamics are similar to those obtained earlier. For
example, persistent fluctuations of prices and production capacities are a robust feature
of both set-ups. And so are Pareto-type size distributions and skewed age profiles. In-
terestingly, however, no “shake-out” seems to occur in the number of firms at some point
in its infancy. In this set-up, notwithstanding the property – given appropriate demand
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Figure 3.6: The total number of firms 0 ≤ t ≤ 1000.
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Figure 3.7: The size distribution at t = 50.
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Figure 3.8: The size distribution at t = 500.
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Figure 3.9: The life time distribution for 1 ≤ t ≤ 500.
–28 –
conditions –, in this set-up, that both productive capacity of the industry and the number
of firms have upper bounds, the industry seems to approach them without any major
structural discontinuities13.
4 Modeling learning on both capital and labour efficiencies
The two foregoing models may also be combined to account for those (empirically more
plausible) circumstances whereby entrants are allowed to innovate, in probability, will
respect to both capital and labour efficiencies. In order to define this set-up one needs four
random nonnegative variables: ξC, ξL, ζC, distributed over [aC, bC], and ζL, distributed
over [aL, bL]. Here Eξi > 0, Dξi <∞, and 0 < ai < bi <∞, i = C, L.
Set for t ≥ 0
A
(C)
t+1 = A
(C)
t + ξ
t+1
C , A
(C)
0 = 0, and A
(L)
t+1 = A
(L)
t + ξ
t+1
L , A
(L)
0 = 0.
Allowing for k ≥ 1 newcomers at each time t ≥ 0, define their capital ratios and variable
costs as exp{−A
(C)
t }ζ
i
C and exp{−A
(L)
t }ζ
i
L, tk+1 ≤ i ≤ (t+1)k. Here ζ
t
i , t ≥ 0, i = C, L,
and ζji , j ≥ 1, i = C, L, are independent (in all indexes) realizations of the corresponding
random variables.
For a firm i (whose capital ratio is ai and variable costs mi) manufacturing at time t
we have as above
Qit+1 = Q
i
t
{
1− d+
λ
vai
max[H(Qt)−mi, 0]
}
X
Qit{1−d+
λ
vai
max[H(Qt)−mi,0]}≥τc/ai
.
Interestingly, in this set-up productive capacities of newcomers grow to infinity in the same
way as in the model with increasing productivity alone. So unboundedly grows the total
productive capacity of the industry. Hence, the limit behaviour of this industry turns out
to be similar to the growth pattern of an industry where newcomers learn how to improve
the productivity of capital alone, as in the first of the foregoing models.
5 Conclusions
In this work we have explored some dynamic properties of industrial dynamics driven by
an ever-lasting flow of entrants which might, in probability, be carriers of technological
innovations (that is, in our simple model, more efficient techniques of production).
13A similar profile in the evolution of the number of firms is also obtained, under somewhat similar
Schumpeter Mark I regimes of learning, in Dosi et al. (1995).
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Some properties of the ensuing industrial dynamics appear to be generic features of
a wide class of evolutionary processes nested into microeconomic heterogeneity and mar-
ket selection. In particular, a) persistent fluctuations of aggregate variables – such as
price, production capacity, total output –; b) turbulence in market shares; and, c) skewed
size distributions of firms all appear to be robust features of the competitive process,
irrespectively of any more detailed characterization of the origins and the bounds upon
microeconomic heterogeneity. (In this respect compare the results presented here with
Winter et al. (1997).) Other properties – corresponding to other empirically observable
regularities – depend, on the contrary, upon more specific characterizations of the ways mi-
cro heterogeneity is generated. That includes whether and how innovations are generated
along the history of the industry.
First, and most intuitively, necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the industry to
exponentially grow is the persistent enlargement of notional opportunities of innovation.
In the foregoing model the process is represented as an endogenous drift in the set of
input coefficients stochastically attainable at each time, conditional on the best-practise
knowledge already achieved at such a time. It is an ‘open-ended’ dynamic insofar as, in
the limit, there is no bound upon the possibilities of discovery, even if at each time what
is attainable is ultimately constrained by what has been learned up to that time.
Second, as just mentioned, such open-endedness in in innovative opportunities is not
sufficient to guarantee self-sustained growth. Rather, the latter stems from the interplay
between learning opportunities and demand patterns. A significant implication of the
foregoing modeling experiments – where, on purpose, we did not allow any exogenous
demand drift – is that notionally unbounded dynamic increasing returns may fully exert
their impact upon output growth only insofar as they are not limited by the extent of the
market, to paraphrase the old adagio by Adam Smith. In the set-up with learning about
capital efficiency, the market indefinitely grows in real terms because technical progress
provides, for its nature, also a corresponding possibility of expansionary investment in
productive capacity. Given the hypotheses of that specification of the model, even if the
demand curve does not shift (in nominal terms) over time, capital costs of production
per unit of output progressively wither away as time goes on, and, as a consequence, the
benefits of increasing returns to knowledge accumulation can be fully reaped throughout.
Conversely, this might not be the case with learning occuring only with respect to
labour efficiencies. Here, the long-term evolutionary outcomes depend upon the interplay
between the shape of the demand curve and the level of fixed capital costs per unit of out-
put. The latter obviously set a ceiling to the maximum expansion of production capacity
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from any t to t+ 1 for whatever gross margin each firm is able to obtain. Whether such
a ceiling to micro growth in any finite time carries over to the long-run system properties
is, however, a quite different matter. As discussed above, under these circumstances, self-
sustained growth of the industry can be attained only if the shape of the demand curve is
such as to allow in the long-run an indefinite expansion of total gross surplus and of net
investments in production capacity14.
In the foregoing paper we focused upon a specific archetype of learning dynamics,
which – in tune with earlier literature – we called Schumpeter Mark I. In such a stylized
learning regime, one restricted a positive probability of learning to entrants, with inputs
coefficients fixed thereafter for all incumbents. While an obvious violence to a much more
messy empirical evidence, this modeling framework allows an easier identification of the
properties of that subset of learning processes whereby incumbent knowledge is highly
inertial and the dominant source of change is the arrival of new entrepreneurial trials.
Given the formal Schumpeter Mark I set-up, we show as our third major conclusion
that generally the process of competition and collective growth must be fueled by an un-
ending process of entry and exit, with each individual firm dying with probability one in
finite time. (The only exception we find is under some rather special demand patterns
whereby an infinitely growing number of firms can survive, with non-decreasing abso-
lute size, notwithstanding vanishingly small market shares, given exponentially growing
markets).
Fourth, with the open-ended innovative dynamics considered here, the role of history
– i.e., more formally, path-dependence – more forcefully appears in the account of long-
term dynamics. As already noted in Winter et al. (1997), even in a ‘closed’ world of
technological options, the expressions for long-term average statistics for the industry
contains a possible dependence upon initial conditions (insofar as more than one ergodic
set exists, determining the Markovian structure of industry evolution(s)). Here, however,
path-dependency acquires much more straightforward implications. In essence, under all
conditions whereby the industry unboundedly grows, what one is able to prove, in a
history-independent fashion, is that a whole class of exponential functions may fit any
pattern generated under these conditions. However, as we show above, path-dependence
essentially affects which growth rate turns out to be selected also in the long-term.
14Clearly, the condition would be more easily met if one allowed some positive drift over time in demand
curves themselves (and plausibly also negative drifts for ‘shrinking’ industries).
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Appendix
In the following, we provide the proofs omited in the text.
Lemma 2.1. The total productive capacity Qt of the industry goes to infinity with
probability one as t→∞.
Proof. We have to show that for every δ ∈ (0, 1) and every positive Q there is a finite
time instant t(δ, Q) such that
P{Qt ≥ Q, t ≥ t(δ, Q)} ≥ 1− δ. (a1)
By the strong law of large numbers (see, for example, Loe`ve (1955), p. 239)
At = (t+ 1)[Eξ+ o
1
t (1)]. (a2)
Here Eξ designates the expected value of ξ. Also, o1t (1) → 0 with probability one as
t→∞. Fix a δ ∈ (0, 1) and a Q ∈ (0,∞). Since o1t (1)→ 0 with probability one, there is
a finite time instant t(δ) such that
P
{
|o1t (1)| <
1
2
Eξ, t ≥ t(δ)
}
≥ 1− δ.
This implies
P
{
At ≥
t+ 1
2
Eξ, t ≥ t(δ)
}
≥ 1− δ.
Hence, capital ratios of firms coming from t(δ) onward do not exceed exp{− t+12 Eξ}b with
probability 1 − δ. Since initial capitals are always larger than c, the total productive
capacity Vt = exp{At}Θ
t of all firms coming at t ≥ t(δ), exceeds exp{ t+12 Eξ}kc/b with
probability 1− δ. Here
Θt =
k∑
i=1
θtk+i/ζtk+i.
Notice that
Qt+1 ≥ Vt, t ≥ 0. (a3)
Hence,
P
{
Qt ≥ exp
{ t
2
Eξ
}
kc/b, t ≥ t(δ)
}
≥ 1− δ.
Set tQ = min t : exp{
t
2Eξ}kc/b ≥ Q. For t(δ, Q) = max[t(δ), tQ] inequality (a1) holds
true.
The lemma is proved.
Theorem 2.2. If ǫ > 0, then every firm dies in a finite random time with probability
one.
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Proof. Assume on the contrary that there is a firm surviving infinitely long with
positive probability. Designating by qt its capital at time t, we have
P{qt ≥ ǫc, t ≥ t0} > δ > 0. (a4)
Here t0 ≥ 0 stands for the time instant when the firm came to the industry. Also, take
into account here that a firm stays alive as long as its capital does not drop below the
death threshold ǫc.
Let Q = min x > 0 : 1− d + λH(x)/va∗ ≤ 1− d/2, where a∗ designates the capital
per unit of output of the firm surviving infinite time. By Lemma 2.1 there is a finite time
instant t(δ/2, Q) such that
P{Qt ≥ Q, t ≥ t(δ/2, Q)} ≥ 1− δ/2. (a5)
For every pair of events A,B ∈ F
P{A ∩ B} = P{A} − P{A ∩ (Ω \B)} ≥ P{A} − P{Ω \B}. (a6)
Taking this into account, we have by (a4) and (a5) that
P{Qt ≥ Q, qt ≥ ǫc, t ≥ t1} ≥ P{Qt ≥ Q, t ≥ t1} − 1 + P{qt ≥ ǫc, t ≥ t1} > δ/2,
where t1 = max[t0, t(δ/2, Q)]. Thus, the event {Qt ≥ Q, qt ≥ ǫc, t ≥ t1} occurs with
positive probability. But, if it happens, then simultaneously
qt+1 ≤ qt(1− d/2) and qt ≥ ǫc
for t ≥ t1. These inequalities cannot hold simultaneously. Indeed, qt1 is a finite value,
namely,
qt1 = qt0
t1−1∏
i=t0+1
[
1− d+
λ
v
H(Qi)/a∗
]
.
Since 1 − d/2 ∈ (0, 1), the first inequality implies that from t1 onward the sequence {qt}
is exponentially declining. The second inequality assumes that this sequence is uniformly
bounded from below by ǫc > 0. This contradiction shows that there cannot be a firm
surviving infinitely long with positive probability.
The theorem is proved.
Theorem 2.3. With probability one exp{−αt}Qt →∞ as t→ ∞ for every α < Eξ.
Moreover, if
lim
x→∞
H(x)x = 0,
then with probability one exp{−αt}Qt → 0 as t→∞ for every α > Eξ.
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Proof. The first statement holds by (a3). Let us prove the second one. Notice that
Qt+1 = Qt
[
1− d+
λ
v
H(Qt)
nt∑
i=1
Qit/Qtai
]
+ Vt − Et, t ≥ 1. (a7)
Recall that ai stands for the capital per unit of output of the i-th firm. Also, Et ≥ 0
designates the total outflow of productive capacity at t due to mortality of inefficient
firms. Dropping Et in (a7), we get
Qt+1 ≤ Qt
[
1− d+
λ
v
H(Qt)
nt∑
i=1
Qit/Qtai
]
+ Vt, t ≥ 1.
Since H(·) decreases, by (a3) this inequality can be further relaxed
Qt+1 ≤ Qt
[
1− d+
λ
v
H(Vt−1)
nt∑
i=1
Qit/Qtai
]
+ Vt, t ≥ 1. (a8)
We have that
nt∑
i=1
Qit/Qtai ≤
1
mini=1,2....,nt ai
, min
i=1,2....,nt
ai ≥ exp{−At−1}a, Vt ≥ exp{At}kc/b.
Consequently,
nt∑
i=1
Qit/Qtai ≤
b
kca
Vt−1.
Thus, by (a8), we get
Qt+1 ≤ Qt
[
1− d+
λb
kvca
H(Vt−1)Vt−1
]
+ Vt, t ≥ 1.
By (a2), Vt → ∞ with probability one as t → ∞. Hence, taking into account that
xH(x)→ 0 as x→∞, the latter inequality can be rewritten as
Qt+1 ≤ Qt[1− d+ o
2
t (1)] + Vt, t ≥ 1, (a9)
where o2t (1)→ 0 with probability one as t→∞.
Fix an α > Eξ. Setting Xt = exp{−αt}Qt and Wt = exp{−α(t + 1)}Vt, we get by
(a9) that
Xt+1 ≤ exp{−α}Xt[1− d+ o
2
t (1)] +Wt ≤ Xt[1− d+ o
2
t (1)] +Wt, t ≥ 1. (a10)
We have to show that for every δ > 0 and σ ∈ (0, 1) there is a finite time instant t(δ, σ)
such that
P{Xt ≤ δ, t ≥ t(δ, σ)} ≥ 1− σ. (a11)
Fix some δ > 0 and σ ∈ (0, 1). Since o1t (1) in (a2) converges to zero with probability
one, there is a finite time instant t1(σ) such that
P
{
|o1t (1)| ≤
1
2
(α− Eξ), t ≥ t1(σ)
}
≥ 1− σ/2. (a12)
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Similarly, there is a finite time instant t2(σ) such that
P
{
|o2t (1)| ≤
d
2
, t ≥ t2(σ)
}
≥ 1− σ/2. (a13)
By (a2) and (a12) we conclude that
P
{
Wt ≤
kh
a
exp
{
−
(α −Eξ)(t+ 1)
2
}
, t ≥ t1(σ)
}
≥ 1− σ/2. (a14)
Thus, setting t(σ) = max[t1(σ), t2(σ)] and taking into account (a10), (a13) and (a14), we
get by (a6) that
P
{
Xt+1 ≤ Xt(1− d/2) +
kh
a
exp
{
−
(α− Eξ)(t+ 1)
2
}
, t ≥ t(σ)
}
≥ 1− σ,
or, equivalently, for every finite n ≥ 1
P
{
Xt+n ≤ Xt(1− d/2)
n+
kh
a
exp
{
−
(α− Eξ)(t+ 1)
2
} n−1∑
i=0
(1− d/2)n−i−1 exp
{
−
(α− Eξ)i
2
}
, t ≥ t(σ)
}
≥ 1− σ.
Since
n−1∑
i=0
(1− d/2)n−i−1 exp
{
−
(α− Eξ)i
2
}
≤
n−1∑
i=0
(1− d/2)n−i−1 =
2
d
[1− (1− d/2)n] <
2
d
,
the latter unequality implies that for every finite n ≥ 1
P
{
Xt+n ≤ Xt(1− d/2)
n +
2kh
ad
exp
{
−
(α− Eξ)(t+ 1)
2
}
, t ≥ t(σ)
}
≥ 1− σ.
There is a finite tδ such that for t ≥ tδ
2kh
ad
exp
{
−
(α−Eξ)(t+ 1)
2
}
≤ δ/2.
Hence, by the previous inequality we get that for every finite n ≥ 1
P{Xt+n ≤ Xt(1− d/2)
n + δ/2, t ≥ tδ,σ} ≥ 1− σ, (a15)
where tδ,σ = max[t(σ), tδ]. By (a7), the random variable Qtδ,σ is finite with certainty.
Hence, Xtδ,σ is also a finite random variable with certainty. There is a finite number nδ,σ
such that
P{Xtδ,σ(1− d/2)
n ≤ δ/2, n ≥ nδ,σ} = 1. (a16)
Setting t(δ, σ) = tδ,σ + nδ,σ, by (a15) and (a16) we get (a11).
The theorem is proved.
Next, let us show that in the version of the model with growing labor productivity
each firm dies in a finite random time with probability one.
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Theorem 3.2. If ǫ > 0, then each firm dies in a finite random time with probability
one.
Proof. The death threshold implies that if a firm lives infinitely long, then its capital
does not drop below ǫc. Since the total productive capacity of the industry is bounded
with certainty, we conclude that starting from a finite random time τ with probability
one every newcoming firm dies in a finite time. Indeed, otherwise we would have infinitely
many firms living infinitely long. This, by boundness from below of their capitals, would
imply that the total productive capacity goes to infinity.
At time t ≥ τ consider two firms: one with capital ct and variable costs per unit of
output m, the other with capital c′t and variable costs per unit of output m
′, m > m′.
Then
ct+1
c′t+1
=
ct
{
1− d+ λvC max[H(Qt)−m, 0]
}
χct{1−d+ λvC max[H(Qt)−m,0]}≥ǫc
c′t
{
1− d+ λvC max[H(Qt)−m
′, 0]
}
χc′t{1−d+
λ
vC
max[H(Qt)−m′,0]}≥ǫc
. (a17)
Assume that there is a firm living infinitely long with positive probability. Set ct for
its capital at t and m for its variable costs per unit of output. Then
P{ct ≥ ǫc, t ≥ τ
′} = δ > 0, (a18)
where τ ′ < τ stands for the time instant when it comes to the industry. By (a2) there is
a time instant t1 such that
P{At >
t+ 1
2
Eξ, t ≥ t1} ≥ 1− δ/2.
Choose t2 such that exp{−
t+1
2 Eξ}h < m for t ≥ t2. Then with probability exceeding
1− δ/2 every firm coming after t∗ = max(t1, t2) has variable costs less than m. Consider
a time instant t ≥ max(t∗, τ). There is a firm coming at t. Set c′t for its capital and m
′
for its variable costs. Since we are in the time domain where every entrant dies in a finite
time, this new firm dies at a finite time instant t′ > t with probability one. Since m′ < m,
by (a17) we get that
ct′ ≤ ct
c′t′
ct
≤ ct
ǫc
c
≤ ǫct. (a19)
At t′ another firm comes to the industry and, again, its variable costs are less than m.
Similarly, it dies at t′′ and we obtain that ct′′ ≤ ǫct′ or ct′′ ≤ ǫ
2ct.
Let ǫ < 1. Since ct ≤ CQ∗ for t ≥ τ
′, we conclude that ctk → 0 as k → ∞ for some
sequence of finite time instants tk, k ≥ 1, and this occurs with probability at least 1−δ/2.
By (a6) and (a18) we see that with probability at least δ/2 both the sequence ct, t ≥ τ,
is bounded from below by ǫc > 0 and has a subsequence ctk, k ≥ 1, converging to zero.
This is impossible.
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Let ǫ = 1. There are two possibilities, namely first, there is a sequence of finite time
instants tk, k ≥ 1, such that λH(Qtk)/vC − m ≥ d, or second, λH(Qt)/vC − m < d
starting from a finite time instant τ ′′ with probability one.
In the first case by (a17) we see that for every firm coming at some tk ≥ max(t
∗, τ)
ctk+1
c′tk+1
=
ctk
c′tk
{
1−
λ
vC
m−m′
1− d+ λvC [H(Qtk)−m
′]
}
≤
ctk
c′tk
{
1−
λ
vC
m−m′
1− d+ λvC [H(0)−m
′]
}
=
ctk
c′tk
r, (a20)
where c′tk stands for the capital and m
′ for the variable costs of the newcomer. Since we
are in the time domain where every entrant dies in a finite time, this firm dies at t′1 > tk.
By (a17) and (a20) we see that
ct′
1
c′t′
1
≤
ct′
1
−1
c′t′
1
−1
≤ . . .≤
ctk+1
c′tk+1
≤ r
ctk
c′tk
.
Thus
ct′
1
≤ rctk
c′t′
1
c′tk
≤ rctk
ǫc
c
≤ rctk.
By (a19) we conclude that during the life time of any firm coming from max(t∗, τ) onward,
the firm living infinitely long at the very least does not gain anything in terms of capital
stock. But it shrinks r times during the life times of firms coming at tk ≥ max(t
∗, τ).
This occurs with probability not less than 1− δ/2. Thus, with the same probability there
is a sequence t′k, k ≥ 1, such that ct′k → 0 as k → ∞. By (a6) and (a18) we conclude
that with probability at least δ/2 both the sequence ct, t ≥ τ, is bounded from below by
ǫc > 0 and has a subsequence ct′
k
, k ≥ 1, converging to zero. This is impossible.
Now let λH(Qt)/vC −m < d starting from a finite time instant τ
′′ with probability
one. Hence, from τ ′′ onward, the total productive capacity evolves in the domain where
the notional firm surviving for infinite time shrinks. Consequently, we must have that
λH(Qt)/vC = d + m + ot(1) where ot(1) → 0 with probability one as t → ∞. This
implies that with probability at least 1 − δ/2 every firm coming after max(t∗, τ ′′) will
be unboundedly growing (almost as (1 +m −m′)t for t → ∞) in contradiction with the
uniform boundness of the total productive capacity.
Thus we have showed that assuming that there is a firm surviving infinitely long with
positive probability yields a contradiction.
The theorem is proved.
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